De un foro de Battlefront, creo que puede interesar a los adeptos a la guerra en el frente oriental:

Yesterday I read something interesting that may give an indication on the Soviet attitude about the qualitative differences between themselves and the US/NATO. In the 1988 edition of Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army , David C. Isby, Jane's Publishing Co., p.55; Isby writes:

quote:The Soviets believe that a future war in Europe, China, or South Asia will be decided not by the sum total of weapons or tactics, but at operational level. They are well aware that in the Second World War their tactics were never as good as those of the Germans. Soviet weapons, while excellent and of serviceable design, were seldom able to trump on the battlefield through technological superiority alone. It was Soviet operational art that surrounded Stalingrad, defended Kursk and destroyed Army Group Centre. The quality and weapons of German units really did not matter, once they had been encircled by the Soviets. The emphasis on the operational level of war means that any limitations suffered by weapons and tactics are of secondary importance. Soviet weapons and tactics and the men who use them do not have to be as good as those of their opponents. They simply have to be adequate for the execution of Soviet operational-level actions.

The increased emphasis on the operational level may be in part a reaction to improvments in NATO weapons and tactics. The Soviets, who would find it difficult to make their weapons and tactics superior to those of NATO, have apparently decided not to match Western improvements but to trump them by looking to operations that will, if successful, make irrelevant any superiority. The answer to a good tank is not necessarily a better tank. The solution may lie instead in a raiding force across the tank's supply route, or a missile on the tank's headquarters, or spraying the tank with nerve agent in its vehicle park, or best of all, using the full capabilities of the Soviet state to make the tank owner's refrain from using it at all. . . .

In contrast to their tactics, the Soviet's operational science and art cannot be described as stereotyped. In the Second World War, the Germans realised that while Soviet tactical commanders were usually amateurs, their operational-level commanders were worthy opponents, as Stalingrad, Kursk, Orel-Bryansk, and the Destruction of Army Group Centre demonstrated. If much of Soviet tactical thinking can be seen as battle drills and terrain-dependent template deployments, then operational thinking is guided by the study of military history. As as result, it is much harder to predict the actions of a Soviet front commander than it is those of a battalion commander.

Saludos,
Panta

Por eso pierdo por los rusos!! No me daba cuenta pero es exactamente como luchaban.

Jejeje no está mal y que se yo si tiene razón pero... no es dejar un poco mal a Chuikov para en su lugar dejar muy bien a Zhukov? Y gran parte de ese exito operacional tb vino dado por emplear las tacticas de blitzkrieg alemanas no?

Lastima que el Combat Mission Campaings esté tan estancado... los rusos podrian explotar su superioridad operacional si recreasen bien ese juego.

En el mundillo de los estudios militares del periodo de la SGM, es bien conocido que:

• Si quieres aprender sobre las mejores tacticas, estudia los documentos alemanes.
• Si quieres aprender el arte operacional, entonces estudia a los rusos.
• Y si quieres aprender sobre logística a nivel estrategico, estudia a los aliados occidentales.

Los alemanes nunca tuvieron una verdadera doctrina operacional, para los alemanes el nivel operacional no existia, y era tratado simplemente como tacticas a mayor escala... nunca como un ente independiente.

Tambien se dice que un buen estratega es aquel que domina el arte de la logistica. Los estrategas que se concentran en temas tacticos no llegan nunca tan lejos como los que se preocupan de temas centrados en la logistica.

Una de las cosas que el nivel táctico al que está concebida la serie de CM no permite jugar es con uno de los conceptos más interesantes a nivel militar, el de maniobra. Al menos al nivel expuesto por Leohnard en su excelente trabajo "The Art of Maneuver".
Esto trae como consecuencia que para balancear las partidas en CM, que se resuelven a nivel de pequeña táctica, generalmente hay que apelar a darle a los soviéticos superioridad numérica, lo que no siempre era el caso, y tropas con un nivel de entrenamiento superior al que habitualmente tenían.
Porque, ¿de qué sirve una ametralladora superior si no tiene municiones? Lo mismo para los blindados, un Tiger puede ser casi invulnerable, pero si se atasca en el barro o la nieve o no puede pasar por los puentes o carece de combustible...Eso no es fácil de simular en CM, lo sería, quizás, en CMC.
Por algo los simuladores profesionales consideran cuidadosamente la capacidad de los puentes, carreteras y demás.
Saludos,
P.