Gran libro sobre Napoleón y sus gestas militares

[Lannes]

Je, tiene muy buena pinta, pero 192$... uff, eso son 30.000 pts , sera por ser una edicion limitada y de lujo...

[Beren]

Son obras de arte y mirad este:

http://www.militaryhistorypress.net/GrandeArmee.html

pero claro, es para verdaderos frikis, esto si k serian para verdaderos regalos de cumpleñaos y cosas asi XD

[Told]

Je, tiene muy buena pinta, pero 192$... uff, eso son 30.000 pts , sera por ser una edicion limitada y de lujo...

Lo bueno que tienen estos libros es que como no los compra nadie - por su precio - luego los encuentras en la librerías de ocasión. A mí me pasó con alguno de los tomos de LES UNIFORMES DU PRIMIER EMPIRE del Cdt. Buckuoy. Sucedió lo mismo con una historia ilustrada de la expedición a Egipto (papel del bueno, encuadernación superior, etc.) pasó de las 30000 pesetas (de las de hace 10 años) a las 5000. El problema es tener la suerte suficiente de encontrarlos en librerias de segunda mano. Supongo que los que vivís en Madrid o Barcelona lo tenéis más fácil. Otra solución es dar la paliza a los amigos y amigas que viajan a París o Londres y obligarles a recorrer las librerías de ocasión y que nos traigan unos cuantos encargos.

Saludos

[Haplo_Patryn]

Un página fantástica sobre Napoleón:

http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/index.html

[Beren]

Si, es de las mejorcitas k hay por no decir k la mejor, muy recomendable

[Camile Desmoulins]

PD: ¡Ah!, por cierto. De momento, por lo que llevo leído, David Chandler no es tan magnánimo con el ejército británico y, es más, critica duramente el estado del ejército británico para cuando la figura de Napoleón empezaba a emerger en la Francia revolucionaria. Leyéndoos a algunos de vosotros podría parecer que el autor pone por las nubes a los británicos pero de momento, por lo que he podido leer, no deja bien ni a su madre.

Aprovecho para contestar úna cuestión planteada tiempo ha. Yo sí creo que chandler es parcial a la hora de sus análisis, auqne no llega al límite de la papanatada. Si uno lee sus comentarios sobre la primera parte de las guerras revolucionaras es muy crítico con los británicos, pero hay que entender que es imposible no serlo. Durante los años que transcurren entre el inicio de la revolución hasta el año 1808, lo que hace los ingleses es optar por la política de ataque indirecto, es decir, desembarcos en zonas alejadas del centro de acción de los franceses, para provocar que estos no puedan concentrar su poderío militar y distraer tropas. Pero esa política se torna nociva, como demuestra sus fracasos en Holanda, Dinamarca, Toulon, guerras de la Vendee, Sicilia y un largo etcétera. Como siempre, en la política británica hay errores, a veces mantenidos largo tiempo por el establishment militar y político inglés. Nadie puede sostener hoy en día lo acertado de la elección de los lugares, ni de los mandos, ni el desarrollo de las campañas. Aunque hoy tengamos la idea de los británicos como vencedores, pasaron cerca de 16 años de fracasos ininterrumpidos, lo que en españa hubiera costado muchas cabezas y probablemente una crisis de dimensiones impensables. Aquí Chandler es muy crítico con lo británico, pero tampoco se regodea. Queda además enmascarado por su mal disimulada admiración por Napoleón, lo que le da una apariencia de objetividad mayor de la que es en realidad.

El éxito británico se acaba fundamentando en lo de siempre: una flota muy capaz de mantener vivo el espíritu, cuando ya no queda nada más; una política exterior clara y firme, sin giros bruscos dependiendo de partidos, advenedizos o de circunstancias menores; la aparición de un militar (Wellesey) capaz de ver los errores de la política de acción indirecta y llevarla al lugar correcto (España) y la vija política británica respecto al ejército: prefiero pocos y buenos que muchos malos, junto a una excelente y soprprendente asociación de un 33% de tropas foráneas entrenadas por ellos. aquí es donde Chandler se pierde un poco más. Lo llevo en esencial al caso español, donde no reconoce los méritos españoles para considerar el éxito casi en exclusiva británico 8error que creo que se ha ido corrigiendo poco a poco en la historiografía británica). Un par de ejemplos sobre la campaña de 1808, la única que trata Chandler sobre España: Considera que Castaños se dirige muy lentamente a Madrid desde Bailén, cuando sabe perfectamente que se le tiende una "celada" diplomátca (hábilmente urdida por Grouchy) para propiciar su retraso. Tardará, por esos retrasos, cerca de un mes en entrar en Madrid, dando tiempo al rey José a aposentarse en Vitoria. Sin embargo no le parece nada sospechoso que Baird, desembarcado en octubre en La Coruña, no llegue a Salamanca hasta casi dos meses más tarde... Claro, culpa del retraso a los 10 días previos que fue retenido su contingente por el alcalde de La Coruña. Evidentemente Baird, de vuelta a Coruña perseguirdo por Napoleón hará el recorrido citado en unod 18 días, ahí sí parece tener prisa. Resultado: los españoles somos indolentes, incumplidores y lentos, frente a la velocidad británica. En otras cosasiones se empecina en el error. A la batalla de Espinosa la denomina Pancorvo, algo comprensible en 1966, pero no que reitere el error en ediciones muy posteriores. Muchos errores se deben a consultar poco la bibliografía española o no considerar en exceso a autores españoles, que tienen muy poco peso en este tema.

Todo esto no quita para que yo condidere a Chandler uno de los mejores, prácticamente el mejor, un maestro que domina la materia que habla en todos los sentidos, pero le reconozco estos fallos, menores, pero que podría haber mejorado.

[Camile Desmoulins]

Un página fantástica sobre Napoleón:

http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/index.html

Excelente página... No la conocía. Al bote

Camille

[deibiz]

Un página fantástica sobre Napoleón:

http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/index.html

Excelente página... No la conocía. Al bote

Camille

po zi, una caña...

un extracto de un articulo sobre el fuego de fusil en los combates de la epoca:

Concentrated firepower was essential because of the poor accuracy of the smoothbore muskets used during Napoleonic Wars. During firing in three ranks, "elbow-to-elbow", the infantrymen were struggling for space to load, aim and fire their muskets. Napoleonic infantry was formed on 3 ranks. A 600-men strong battalion had 200 men in the first, 200 in second and 200 men in the third rank. During a firefight the troopers of 3rd rank had to load their muskets and give them to those in 2nd rank. But in reality it was impossible to keep them doing this under fire. The pressure of loading and firing under tremendous stress resulted in wounds inflicted by the 3rd rankers on their comrades who stand in front of them, and fingers and elbows were shot away from the fire of the troopers of rear rank. French commander Gouvion St. Cyr (1764-1830) (external link) claimed that 1 in 4 casualties were inflicted by own fire.

While under stress many infantrymen fired without waiting for orders and as fast as possible. Even in recent war in 2004 in Iraq tens of thousand of rounds were fired before one casualty was inflicted. The fast firing relieved anxiety and occupied troopers' minds and bodies. Some soldiers were so stressed that they loaded their rifles time after time but they never fired. After one of the battles (Gettysburg) of Civil War the discarded 37,574 rifles were collected and sent to Washington to be inspected and reissued. Approx. 24,000 of them were still loaded.
- 25 % of them (6,000 rifles) had 1 round in the barrel
- 75 % (18,000 rifles) had 2 to 10 rounds in the barrel
One rifle had been stuffed to the top with 23 rounds.

In training the soldier was under close observation and the pressure upon him was to give satisfaction to his officer, whereas the man engaging the enemy was of necessity pretty much on his own, and the pressure on him was to remain alive, if possible. Thus the accuracy of fire in training was much higher than in combat. In 1755 two companies of Prussian grenadiers fired at a target 10 paces broad and 10 feet high. At 300 paces they scored approx. 12.5 % hits and at 150 paces 46 %. In another test out of 720 French infantrymen 52 hit the target of 3m x 100 m. At 200 m there were only 18 hits.

According to S.L.A. Marshall's "Men Against Fire" at best only between 15% and 55 % of a troop really participated in fighting and actively seek to kill the enemy with their muskets and bayonets. The other men fought more with the object of staying alive than of actively aiming to kill the enemy. They simply didn't aim at the enemy but fired wildly. This fact partially explain why such a high ratio of soldiers failed to hit the target.
A Prussian veteran of the Seven Years War wrote: "one is firing totally differently in battle than on the drill ground, then the advancing infantry opens fire, despite what is taught and drilled on the exercise ground, often at 800 paces against the enemy or at least at 600 paces." It resulted in very low casualty rate.

In the heat of battle the soldier often forgot that in close range it was necessary to point the musket at the feet of a target because the kick of the musket threw the barrel up, causing the ball to arc up, to pass over the target.


The majority of calculations below were done by counting all the expenditure of the amount of rounds fired and the number of soldiers wounded and killed. Some of the lightly wounded went uncounted and small part of ammunition nominally fired was thrown away by soldiers. The two factors greatly lowered the ratio of hits. Mark Adkin calculated the effectiveness of muskets at Waterloo. He wrote that in the prolonged fighting for Hougoumont "it took 224 French musket shots to secure a hit. This is not such a poor performance as it seems. Most defenders (Germans and Brits) were behind cover of some sort for much of the time, if only a hedge or a tree. The majority were behind brick walls."


According to R. Henegan the British infantry at Vittoria fired on average 459 rounds for 1 French casualty. (p. 344-345 in "Seven Years' Campaigning in the Peninsula and the Netherlands", 1846).

According to Guibert only 0.2 % of all shots hit the target.

Gassendi calculated that only 1 shot in 3.000 resulted in casulty.

Hughes calculated for Albuera, for several volleys at 100 yards the British achieved 5 % ratio of casualties.

Napier claimed that in Spain he witnessed volleys fired by British infantry where out of 300 musketballs fired none hit the target.

At Vittoria, the British infantry had on average 1 hit in 459 shots fired. I assume that the ratio for French infantry was lower, as they had much less time for training.

In 1813 at Gohrde 66 French infantrymen fired at 60-80 paces at Germans hiting 27 Hannoverians and Bremen-Verden (40 % hits). This very high ratio of hits can be easily explained, the most effective was the first volley, the next salvos were usually much worse. In this case the count is only for one volley.

In 1813 at Dennewitz a single squadron of 'Brandenburg' Dragoons (Prussians) attacked a French battalion formed in square. The infantry delivered volley at 30 paces killing 23 horses and 7 men, and wounding 18 horses and 21 men. Eighty dragoons were untouched by the musketry at close range.

[Camile Desmoulins]

Un página fantástica sobre Napoleón:

http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/index.html

Excelente página... No la conocía. Al bote

Camille

po zi, una caña...

un extracto de un articulo sobre el fuego de fusil en los combates de la epoca:

Concentrated firepower was essential because of the poor accuracy of the smoothbore muskets used during Napoleonic Wars. During firing in three ranks, "elbow-to-elbow", the infantrymen were struggling for space to load, aim and fire their muskets. Napoleonic infantry was formed on 3 ranks. A 600-men strong battalion had 200 men in the first, 200 in second and 200 men in the third rank. During a firefight the troopers of 3rd rank had to load their muskets and give them to those in 2nd rank. But in reality it was impossible to keep them doing this under fire. The pressure of loading and firing under tremendous stress resulted in wounds inflicted by the 3rd rankers on their comrades who stand in front of them, and fingers and elbows were shot away from the fire of the troopers of rear rank. French commander Gouvion St. Cyr (1764-1830) (external link) claimed that 1 in 4 casualties were inflicted by own fire.

While under stress many infantrymen fired without waiting for orders and as fast as possible. Even in recent war in 2004 in Iraq tens of thousand of rounds were fired before one casualty was inflicted. The fast firing relieved anxiety and occupied troopers' minds and bodies. Some soldiers were so stressed that they loaded their rifles time after time but they never fired. After one of the battles (Gettysburg) of Civil War the discarded 37,574 rifles were collected and sent to Washington to be inspected and reissued. Approx. 24,000 of them were still loaded.
- 25 % of them (6,000 rifles) had 1 round in the barrel
- 75 % (18,000 rifles) had 2 to 10 rounds in the barrel
One rifle had been stuffed to the top with 23 rounds.

In training the soldier was under close observation and the pressure upon him was to give satisfaction to his officer, whereas the man engaging the enemy was of necessity pretty much on his own, and the pressure on him was to remain alive, if possible. Thus the accuracy of fire in training was much higher than in combat. In 1755 two companies of Prussian grenadiers fired at a target 10 paces broad and 10 feet high. At 300 paces they scored approx. 12.5 % hits and at 150 paces 46 %. In another test out of 720 French infantrymen 52 hit the target of 3m x 100 m. At 200 m there were only 18 hits.

According to S.L.A. Marshall's "Men Against Fire" at best only between 15% and 55 % of a troop really participated in fighting and actively seek to kill the enemy with their muskets and bayonets. The other men fought more with the object of staying alive than of actively aiming to kill the enemy. They simply didn't aim at the enemy but fired wildly. This fact partially explain why such a high ratio of soldiers failed to hit the target.
A Prussian veteran of the Seven Years War wrote: "one is firing totally differently in battle than on the drill ground, then the advancing infantry opens fire, despite what is taught and drilled on the exercise ground, often at 800 paces against the enemy or at least at 600 paces." It resulted in very low casualty rate.

In the heat of battle the soldier often forgot that in close range it was necessary to point the musket at the feet of a target because the kick of the musket threw the barrel up, causing the ball to arc up, to pass over the target.


The majority of calculations below were done by counting all the expenditure of the amount of rounds fired and the number of soldiers wounded and killed. Some of the lightly wounded went uncounted and small part of ammunition nominally fired was thrown away by soldiers. The two factors greatly lowered the ratio of hits. Mark Adkin calculated the effectiveness of muskets at Waterloo. He wrote that in the prolonged fighting for Hougoumont "it took 224 French musket shots to secure a hit. This is not such a poor performance as it seems. Most defenders (Germans and Brits) were behind cover of some sort for much of the time, if only a hedge or a tree. The majority were behind brick walls."


According to R. Henegan the British infantry at Vittoria fired on average 459 rounds for 1 French casualty. (p. 344-345 in "Seven Years' Campaigning in the Peninsula and the Netherlands", 1846).

According to Guibert only 0.2 % of all shots hit the target.

Gassendi calculated that only 1 shot in 3.000 resulted in casulty.

Hughes calculated for Albuera, for several volleys at 100 yards the British achieved 5 % ratio of casualties.

Napier claimed that in Spain he witnessed volleys fired by British infantry where out of 300 musketballs fired none hit the target.

At Vittoria, the British infantry had on average 1 hit in 459 shots fired. I assume that the ratio for French infantry was lower, as they had much less time for training.

In 1813 at Gohrde 66 French infantrymen fired at 60-80 paces at Germans hiting 27 Hannoverians and Bremen-Verden (40 % hits). This very high ratio of hits can be easily explained, the most effective was the first volley, the next salvos were usually much worse. In this case the count is only for one volley.

In 1813 at Dennewitz a single squadron of 'Brandenburg' Dragoons (Prussians) attacked a French battalion formed in square. The infantry delivered volley at 30 paces killing 23 horses and 7 men, and wounding 18 horses and 21 men. Eighty dragoons were untouched by the musketry at close range.

Sí conocía valoraciones similares. Incluso hay un buen artículo en español de un profesor de Arqueología de la Autónoma de Madrid, Fernando Quesada - el mayor experto españo en armamento romano y español de época ibérica, y estudioso del de otras épocas- que hablaba sobre el tema en esos términos. No obstante, hay otros estudiosos (casi todos ellos militares) que elevan muy considerablemente el número de bajas causadas en esas circunstancias. También es cierto que el fuego concentrado genera a su vez el inconveniente de un blanco de gran tamaño, cuando quienes disparan sobn filas cerradas sobre filas cerradas.

Aún así, está claro que el tipo de armamento, sin ánima lisa (salvo unos pocos rifles de ánima rayada en manos de tiradores selectos) tiene muy poca precisión en el blanco. La calidad se busca obtener más por velocidades de recarga y mecanización al máximo de los movimientos que otra cosa.

Camille

[Told]

Y por un detalle bastante tonto. En un texto sobre las tácticas de la infantería de la época se insiste en el entrenamiento - sobre todo por la automatización de los movientos que permite una mayor rapidez en la secuencia de disparo -, pero señalaba un detalle que me pareció muy curioso: LOS FRANCESES ENTRENABAN A SU INFANTERÍA EN LÍNEA A DISPARAR ENTRE EL PECHO Y LA CABEZA, PERO LOS INGLESES AL DISPARAR EN LÍNEA CONCENTRABAN EL FUEGO ENTRE LAS RODILLAS Y EL ESTÓMAGO.

El resultado práctico de todo esto es que los franceses hacían muchos menos blanco debido a la tendencia a disparar alto de los fusíles de ánima lisa.

Voy a buscar el texto, lo tengo fotocopiado y no se donde está, para daros la referencia concreta y completa.

[Told]

El libro mencionado es

BATTLE TACTIS OF NAPOLEON AND HIS ENEMIES.

BRENT NOSWORTHY

A la misma distancia, según el libro, los franceses siempre disparaban más alto. A distancias muy cortas viene a dar lo mismo, el problema es cuando la mayor parte de la descarga se pierde por encima de las cabezas enemigas.

Menciona también que el Brown Bess era más preciso que el arma reglamentaria francesa, ahora no me acuerdo del nombre.

Saludos

Saludos